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SCALE-INVARIANT AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS 




This paper proposes a method to analyze endogenous fluctuations of aggregate 
investment when firm-level investment follows an (S,s) policy and has a spillover effect on 
other firms' investments. First, we derive the distribution function of aggregate fluctuations 
in a partial equilibrium of differentiated product markets, under the assumption that a 
firm's position in its (S,s) band follows a uniform distribution. Second, the variance of the 
growth rate of average capital is shown to converge to a non-zero value when the number of 
firms tends to infinity, if the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Third, we 
numerically compute the equilibrium paths in which the firms' positions evolve 
deterministically. The simulations uphold our analytical results as well as exhibit echo 
effects in the output series. Finally, a case of general equilibrium with imperfect 
information is presented in which the analytical results continue to hold. 
Key words: lumpy investment, (S,s) economy, self-organized criticality, contagion 
SCALE-INVARIANT AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS 
OF DISCRETE INVESTMENTS 
1 Introduction 
This paper analyzes a model of endogenous fluctuations of aggregate investment which 
arise from the lumpy behavior of investments at the firm level. It demonstrates that 
aggregate fluctuations occur in a partial equilibrium of product markets even in a 
deterministic environment with infinitely many agents when discrete investments at 
the micro level have spillover effects. 
The recent development of empirical studies on firm-level investments motivates 
this paper. Researchers have shown the importance of discrete choice over the course 
of a firm 's capital adjustment and a great deal of heterogeneity across firms by using 
the longitudinal data. For example, Doms and Dunne (1998) found that establishment 
level capital is adjusted only occasionally but by a jump. Based on the similar em-
pirical findings , Cooper , Haltiwanger, and Power (1999) stressed the role that lumpy 
investments played in aggregate fluctuations. Ericson and Pakes (1995) pointed out the 
important effects of exit and entry behavior of firms on collective industrial dynamics, 
presenting a framework for empirical research of firm dynamics. 
These findings call for an analytical method for a dynamical system in which the 
discrete behavior of many heterogeneous agents are coupled with each other. We con-
sider a specific situation in which firms ' lumpy investments have spillover effects. Due 
to the discreteness of the investment, a firm 's capital exhibits non-harmonic oscillation 
if the capital is depreciated physically. With the spillover effect, the dynamics of the 
system is then represented by a collection of coupled oscillators. This paper proposes 
a method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations in this system. 
The literature on (8,s) economies and on non-linear dynamics has tackled the ques-
tion as to how to analyze the aggregate fluctuations that arise from micro-level dis-
creteness, or more generally, micro-level non-linearity. The theory of (8,s) economies 
(Caplin and 8pulber (1987); Caballero and Engel (1991)) has developed an analytical 
method without reducing the dimensions of agent heterogeneity. The theory showed 
a robust tendency that the distribution of agents in an inaction region converges to 
a uniform distribution in one-sided (8,s) economies. At the uniform distribution, the 
adjustment at the extensive margin works exactly like the adjustment at the inten-
sive margin so that the aggregate behavior does not differ from the smoothly-adjusting 
case (the "neutrality" result). To the contrary, economic models of non-linear dynamics 
have focused on the possibility of endogenous fluctuations arising from the micro-level 
non-linearity. Brock and Hommes (1997), for example, demonstrated that the aggre-
gate dynamics may be reduced to a low-dimensional non-linear map when the number 
of types of agents is small. In fact, numerical studies of weakly-coupled non-linear 
systems (Pikovsky, Rosenblum, and Kurths (2001)) have widely observed endogenous 
aggregate fluctuations even in a greatly heterogeneous system. 
The studies of weakly-coupled non-linear maps typically employ a homogeneous 
collection of harmonic oscillators as a benchmark case to analyze the endogenous fluc-
tuations. On the one hand, this "phase-dynamics" approach is useful to determine the 
periodicity of the aggregate fluctuations. The aggregate fluctuation occurs only if there 
is a certain degree of comovement across agents. Therefore, the frequency of aggregate 
fluctuations centers around the average frequency of the natural rate of adjustment of 
a firm , which in our model is determined by the lumpiness size divided by the depre-
ciation rate. On the other hand, this approach obscures the economic point that the 
aggregate fluctuation is caused by the synchronized timing of firm 's discrete invest-
ment, which is decided optimally rather than exogenously. We thus adopt a version 
of interaction-based models (Brock and Dur lauf (2001)). Previous studies in this class 
of models have shown the possible comovement or "herding" of agents' actions (Gul 
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and Lundholm (1995) for example). In particular, Ellison (1993) and Morris (2000) 
have shown that a best response dynamic can result in a fast spread of a single action 
("contagion") depending on the initial configuration of the actions. Our model endog-
enizes the configuration by incorporating the dynamics of agents' states. We show that 
a large size contagion is likely to occur at the configuration to which the system has a 
tendency to converge. This mechanism is best understood as a globally-coupled case 
of the self-organized criticality introduced by Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and Woodford 
(1993). The dynamics of configuration organizes itself to a critical configuration, and 
therefore the aggregate variables exhibit recurring fluctuations. 
Our results build on the previous studies of one-sided (S,s) economies which show 
that the distribution of a firm's position in the inaction band converges to a uniform 
distribution. The results are divided into three parts. Firstly, an asymptotic distri-
bution function of the aggregate fluctuation evaluated at the uniform distribution is 
derived when the number of firms tends to infinity. Secondly, we show that the vari-
ance of the aggregate fluctuation does not vanish at the infinite limit of the number 
of firms in a partial equilibrium of product markets if the technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale. Thirdly, we compute the equilibrium path numerically and confirm 
the emergence of endogenous fluctuations with a certain degree of periodicity. 
Our model consists of many lTIonopolistic firms that are linked to each other by 
the derived factor demand when each firm uses other firms ' products as intermediate 
inputs. Their interaction forms a network of input-output relations with spillover effects 
in capital adjustments. Suppose that a capital adjustment takes the form of a discrete 
decision. Then there is a chance of a chain-reaction of investments in which one firm 's 
investment triggers another's. This chain-reaction turns out to be represented by a 
branching process in a partial equilibrium of product markets. The first result shows 
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that the size of aggregate investment is sensitive to the detailed configuration of firms' 
positions in the inaction region. As the depreciation of capital drives the evolution 
of the configuration, the aggregate investment exhibits deterministic and endogenous 
fluctuations. The second result provides a case where the neutrality result based on the 
law of large numbers fails to hold. Even though an industry or an economy consists of an 
infinitely many firms , the non-linear behavior at the firm level may not cancel out with 
each other in aggregation. The third result confirms the analytical result of fluctuations 
and shows the presence of the so-called echo effect. The sensitivity analysis shows that 
constant-returns-to-scale is an important environment for the fluctuations. When the 
wage and interest rate are fixed and returns to scale are constant , the equilibrium of 
the product markets with monopolistic suppliers exhibits a "fragile" property. In this 
environment, the size of the chain reaction of investments depends crucially on the 
detailed configuration of the positions in the inaction band. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section 
3 details the analytical and numerical results; Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2 Model 
The product market consists of N monopolists and a representative household. Each 
monopolist j produces a differentiated good Yj , using capital kj and labor hj . Let us 
specify the production technology by a Cobb-Douglas function: 
(1) 
Capital is accumulated over time as: 
(2) 
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where 5j is a firm-specific depreciation rate. Investment ij ,t is a composite good pro-
duced by combining all the goods symmetrically as: 
(3) 
where J1 - 1 > 0 is the mark-up rate. The production technology is allowed to exhibit 
increasing returns to scale as long as a + , < J1 is satisfied. 
We assume that the investment rate is chosen from a discrete set. Specifically, we 
assume that: 
!JL E {( 1 - 5 . ) ( A ~t - 1) } k · t ]] x;t=O ,±1,±2, ... ] , (4) 
where Aj > 1. Note that the choice space for kj ,t is independent of the path: kj,t E 
{(I - 5j )tkj ,oA]t}K-t=O,±1,±2, ... . This assumption implies that the next period capital , 
k j ,t+1 , has to be either the depreciated level, k j ,t(1- 5j ), or its multiplication or division 
by Aj. By this assumption, the producer is forced to invest in a lumpy manner. This 
constraint is a shortcut for modeling the lumpy behavior which typically occurs as 
optimal behavior when an investment incurs fixed costs. This assumption is the only 
departure from the usual model of monopolistic product markets. The main objective 
of this paper is to examine the aggregate consequence of the non-linear behavior of 
producers induced by the discreteness constraint. 
Let Pj,t denote the price of good j at t and Wt denote a real wage. Define a price 
index Pt == (I:f=1 p~~(1-J.L) / N)l-J.L and normalize it to one. Then the monopolist 's profit 
at t is written as: 
N 
7rj ,t == Pj ,tYj ,t - Wthj ,t - L Pl ,tZ!,j ,t 
l=l 
(5) 
The demand function for good j is derived by the usual procedure as in Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977). Let us suppose that the representative household has preferences over 
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the sequence of consumption and hours worked: 
00 L (3tU(ct , Ht ) (6) 
t=O 
where Ct is a composite consumption good produced similarly as the investment good: 
Ct = (~(zf,)~ IN r (7) 
The representative household maximizes the utility function subject to the sequence 
of budget constraints: 
N 
LPj,tZ[t = WtHt + ITt 
j=l 
where ITt is the average dividend frOln firms: ITt == 2:f=l 7rj ,tl N . 
(8) 
Cost minimization of the consumer given the level of consumption Ct implies Zft = 
p;,t/( P,-l) Ct and a relation 2:f=1 pj,tZftl N = Ct· Similarly, the derived demand for 
good j by the monopolist l given the level of investment il,t is obtained as Z;'l,t = 
-p,/(p,-1). IN d "",N I _ . B b·· . h - C "", N I .c Pj,t 'll,t an Dj=l pj,tZj,l,t - 'll,t· Y com 1n1ng WIt Yj,t - Zj,t + Dl=l Zj, l,t lor 
good j, these relations yield the demand function for good j as : Yj ,t = p;,t/(l -P,) (Ct + It) 
where It == 2:f=1 ij,t/N. Define a production index Yt == (2:f=1 Y},~P, IN)P,. Then we 
have an equilibrium relation 2:f=1 Pj,tYj ,t = Yt· Combining with the consumer's budget 
constraint (8) and the equilibrium condition for labor, Ht = 2:j hj,t/ N, we obtain the 
demand function: 
..:::.1!:... 
_ J.L-l~ Yj ,t - Pj,t t (9) 
The monopolist maximizes its discounted future profits as instructed by the rep-
resentative household. The discount rate , rt 1 , is the marginal rate of intertemporal 
substitution of consulnption. Then the monopolist 's problem is defined as follows: 
00 00 ( N) 
max "'"'(r1·· .rt)-l7r -t = "'"' (r1· · ·rt)-l P-tY -t - Wth-t - "'"'PltZlI -
{ _ k - h _ i - z I } ~ ], ~ ], ] , ], ~ , ,],t YJ ,t, J,t+ l , J,t, J,t, l ,j ,t t=O t=O l=l 
(10) 
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subject to the production function (1 ,3) , the capital accumulation (2) , the discreteness 
of the investlnent rate (4) , and the demand function (9). 
Let us define the average capital index Kt as follows: 
(11) 
where p == a./(p, - ')') . Note that p < 1 holds by the assumption a. + ')' < p,. By using 
the optimality condition for hj,t, the profit at t is reduced to a function of (kj ,t, kj,t+l) 
as: 
- -y p ( j.L-l ) 
7rj ,t = DoW t1 - -y Kt-Y=-;Y kJ,t - kj,t+l + (1 - 6j)kj,t (12) 
where Do == (l-,),/p,)(A(,),/p,P)l/(l- 'Y). The profit is concave in kj,t due to p < 1. Thus 
the optimal policy is characterized by an inaction region of kj ,t with a lower bound kj,t 
and an upper bound Ajkj,t. Consider two sequences of kj ,s which are identical except 
at s = t. Such sequences can be constructed by assigning a positive investment at t - 1 
and zero investment at t in one sequence and zero investment at t - 1 and a positive 
investment at t in the other sequence. Then the lower bound of the inaction region is 
derived by solving for kj,t at which the two sequences yield the same discounted profit. 
Namely, if kj ,t is strictly less than kj,t, the producer is better off by adjusting it upward 
rather than waiting. Let the sequence with zero investment at t - 1 have kj,t = kj,t , 
and let the other sequence have kj ,t = Ajkj,t . Then the both sequences have the same 
amount of capital at t-l and t+l: kj,t-l = (1/(1-6j ))kj,t and (Aj(I-6j ))kj,t. Solving 
for kj,t which equates the discounted profits of the two sequences, we obtain: 
(
D (A~ - 1)) l~P -1 - 1 




Equation (13) expresses the strategic complementarity between the average capital 
level K t and the threshold kj,t for an individual capital level kj,t. The degree of the 
complementarity is represented by cp o A percentage change in average capital induces 
cp percent change in the individual threshold kj,t . In particular , the movement in K t 
and kj,t coincides if cp = 1. A simple manipulation reveals the following property. 
Lemma 1 cp 2:: 1 if and only if a + "y 2:: 1. 
Whether the complementarity effect exceeds one is solely determined by the returns to 
scale, and is not dependent on the competitiveness of the market, f-L. 
The spillover effect on kj,t is non-linear because of the threshold. The average 
capital level K t affects the threshold, but it mayor may not induce the adjustment of 
kj ,t. Hence the property of a firm 's capital choice may be summarized as local inertia 
and global strategic complementarity. The individual capital is insensitive to a small 
perturbation in the average capital level , while it synchronizes with the average capital 
if the perturbation is large. 
3 Results 
3.1 Partial Equilibrium 
Let us focus on the network of producers in the product markets while abstracting from 
the rest of the economy by assuming that the equilibrium wage and interest rate only 
depend on the average capital level. Suppose that the equilibrium wage and interest are 
approximated by constantly elastic functions of the average capital K t in the vicinity 
of the time-average levels of wage, interest , and average capital W, r, K: 
Tt - 1 + 6j 




This corresponds to a partial equilibrium assumption when Br = Bw = O. Section 3.3 
provides a case in which the pricing functions above hold in a general equilibrium. By 
assuming (15- 16), the threshold (13) is simplified as: 
i;' = (i) ¢ 
J 
(17) 
where kj is a threshold corresponding to (f, w, K) , and ¢ represents the strategic 
complementarity between the individual and average capital: 
¢ = <p _ , Bw + (1 - , )Br 
(1 - , )(1 - p) (18) 
Note that ¢ is less than <p if Br, Bw > O. This implies that the strategic complementarity 
between producers is weakened due to the equilibrium response of the wage and interest 
rate if the response is pro cyclical. The price response works as a dampening factor in 
the investment propagation as emphasized by Thomas (2002). 
The equilibrium of the product markets is given by a capital profile which satisfies 
kj ,t E [kj,t , Ajkj,t]. This condition allows multiple equilibria. Here we employ best 
response dynamics introduced by Vives (1990) as an equilibrium selection algorithm. 
Suppose that a predetermined capital kj ,t resides within the inaction region. The capital 
in the next period kj ,t+l only decreases by depreciation unless adjusted . In the first step 
of the best response dynamics, the producers adjust capital by Aj if their capital levels 
go below kj,t given K t. Note that , assuming 6j < Aj , the adjustment never exceeds Aj. 
In the second step, K t is calculated by a new capital profile, and the producers adjust 
their capital according to the updated K t . This procedure is repeated until the capital 
profile converges. The adjustments after the second step can be upward or downward, 
depending on whether the upward adjustments in the first step weigh more or less than 
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the depreciation of overall capital. Let us formally define the best response dynamics 
as follows. Set the initial point of the dynamics as kJ,t = kj,t(1- 6j ) and K~ = K t. The 
average capital K;: after u = 1 is defined by the profile kj,t and definition (11). Then 
kj,t, u = 0,1, ... , evolves according to the (S,s) rule: 
Ajkj,t if k'l!- < k~u J,t J,t 
ku+1 -j,t - kj,tl Aj if kj,t > Aj kj,~ (19) 
kU j,t otherwise 
We can show that this dynamics converges at a finite stopping time T with probability 
one when N -t 00 and ¢ ~ 1. Thus the best response dynamics is a valid equilibrium 
selection algorithm. We define the converged point as an equilibrium capital profile at 
t + 1, namely, kj,t+l = kIt. 
The best response dynamics is a realistic equilibrium selection mechanism in a sit-
uation where many agents interact with each other. The only information needed for 
an agent to make a decision is the prices and the average capital level. This selec-
tion mechanism precludes big jumps that occur due to the informational coordination 
among agents. In this sense, the best response dynamics selects the least volatile among 
possible equilibrium paths. 
The aggregate investment fluctuates along with the evolution of configuration of 
the capital profile. To evaluate the magnitude of fluctuations analytically, we re-
gard the capital configuration as being a random variable that takes values within 
the inaction region. Specifically, we assume that the position of an individual capi-
tal relative to the lower bound of its inaction region (in log-scale) follows a uniform 
distribution independent across firms. The uniformity assumption is motivated by 
the theory of (S ,s) economies. Define a producer's position in an inaction region as 
Sj,t = (log kj,t - log kj,t) I log Aj. If Sj,t is mutually independent across j, then Sj,t+l is 
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mutually independent asymptotically as N -* 00 for 1; < 1. Also the dynamics of Sj,t 
shifts a uniform measure to itself. Hence the mutually independent uniform distribu-
tion is an invariant measure asymptotically for 1; < 1. Moreover, Engel (1992) shows 
that Sj,t converges to the uniform distribution if its dynamics contain a random com-
ponent whose distribution flattens over time. Caballero and Engel (1991) also shows 
that the heterogeneity of Aj (as well as 6j in our model) contributes to the convergence 
of a cross-section distribution of Sj to the uniform distribution. We will show that 
the uniformity assumption brings us good insights on the unconditional fluctuations of 
the aggregates. l In Section 3.2, we will see that a departure from this assumption, in 
particular the correlation of Sj ,t, provides a rich structure for the time-series properties 
of the aggregates. 
We assume that Aj and 6j are common across j. Then the periodicity of an indi-
vidual oscillation is q = log Aj Ilog(1 - 6) I. Also the threshold kj,t becomes constant 
across j. Define m = N(logKl-logKt)jlogA where Kl is the average capital at the 
first step of the best response dynamics. m indicates the gap between the effects of 
depreciation and of adjustments at the first step on the average capital. Also define W 
as the total number of firms which adjust their capital in the best response dynamics 
after the first step. Then we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 Suppose that Aj and 6j are common across j. Suppose that Sj ,t is a 
random variable which follows a uniform distribution independently across j. Then 
'mj VN asymptotically follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance: 
(J2 = ((1 - A -2pj q) log A _ (1 - A -pjq) 2) 1 . 
m 2p p (log A)2 (20) 
If 1; :::; I , then IWI conditional to Iml follows an infinitely divisible distribution function 
lSee Nirei (2005) for the case in which the distribution is not uniform. 
asymptotically as N ---t 00: 




for w = 0, 1,. . .. The unconditional distribution of W is symmetric. The tail is ap-
proximated b71: 
( 
Imle-(l-l/4»lml) (e 4>-l)-W Pr (IWI = w 11m!) rv ~ -:;:- W-1.5 
¢ 27f <.p 
(22) 
The normalized aggregate capital growth rate N (log K t+1 - log K t ) converges in distri-
bution to (m + W) log A. 
Proof is deferred to Appendix A. 
The key to the proof is to embed the best response dynamics in a branching process 
which has the following recursive property. Let G (s) be the generating function of the 
subsequent adjustments W, provided that the initial deviation from the time average 
level is m = 1. Let x be the number of firms that adjust capital due to m, and F( s) 
be its generating function. Each adjustment of x then has a chance to propagate in 
the next step just like the initial adjustment m2. Thus the total number of offsprings 
which are originated from each of x follows G( s). Hence we obtain a functional equation 
G(s) = sF(G(s)), from which we derive the distribution of W. A similar functional 
equation obtains in a generalized model with heterogeneous Ai and 6i and with non-
uniformly distributed S~,t (see Nirei (2005)) . The functional equation characterizes 
the propagation distribution completely, because any moment can be derived from the 
functional. 
Proposition 1 implies that the capital growth log K t+1 -log K t conditional to m = 1 
is approximated by a power distribution W-1.5 truncated by an exponential distribution 
2The symbol'"" indicates that the ratio of the both sides converges to one as w ---t 00. 
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that declines at rate 1-¢. The capital growth conditional to m = 1 has an asymptotic 
mean log '\/(N(l- ¢)) and variance (log ,\/N)2(2 - ¢)/(1- ¢)3 for ¢ < 1. The variance 
of the capital growth rate declines linearly in N, hence the law of large numbers obtains. 
The fluctuation of the capital growth exhibits quite a different behavior when ¢ = 1. 
The distribution of W becomes a power law distribution. With the exponent 0.5 (in a 
cumulative distribution), the distribution does not have either mean or variance. That 
is, the sample moments diverge as the sample size increases. In fact, the variance of 
the capital growth rate ceases to depend on N for a large N when ¢ = 1, as we state 
in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2 When ¢ = I , the variance of the aggregate capital growth rate log K t+1 -
log K t converges to a non-zero constant as N ---t 00. The limit standard deviation is: 
(23) 
Proof is deferred to Appendix B. 
This result means that the growth rate fluctuation becomes independent of the 
number of firms as the number grows. No matter how large the aggregative system 
is , the non-linearity of the individual behaviors can add up to aggregate fluctuations. 
Formula (23) with (20) gives the standard deviation of growth rates as a function of the 
lumpiness parameter ,\ and the periodicity q of capital oscillation at the agent level. 
Some numerical examples are shown in Table 1. In the table, we observe that the 
empirically plausible magnitude of lumpiness is large enough to generate the fluctua-
tions in aggregate production observed in the business cycles. Table 1 also shows little 
dependence of the fluctuation Inagnitude on the mark-up rate. In fact the standard 
14 
deviation is not significantly changed even when the mark-up rate goes to infinity, at 
which O"~ is simplified to (1 - l/q)/q. 
Our analytical results imply two things on the investment propagation. First , it 
challenges the conventional view that the sectoral propagation does not add up to a 
large aggregate fluctuation due to the law of large numbers effect. Our result shows 
that, when the response of wage and interest rate is rigid enough, the sectoral propaga-
tion can generate a significant fluctuation in aggregate level. Secondly, our result shows 
that the large, non-degenerate investment fluctuation can occur endogenously in a de-
terministic environment. This implies that an interaction of small non-linear behaviors 
at the micro level may playa crucial role in aggregate investment fluctuations . 
The distribution formula (21) exhibits a non-normal, heavy-tailed distribution that 
converges to a power-law distribution as ¢ ~ 1. This property is well understood in the 
light of critical phenomena. The propagation process is a branching process with mean 
¢. Thus the behavior of the propagation process under the uniform distribution of Si 
is essentially identical to a percolation on a Bethe lattice (Grimmett, 1999, page 254) 
with 1-¢ being the difference of the probability from a critical probability. It is known 
that the cluster volume in the percolation follows a power law with exponent -1.5 at 
mark-up (p, - 1) 0.02 0.2 
lumpiness (log),) 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 
4 0.92 2.29 4.56 9.07 0.92 2.29 4.57 9.10 
periodicity (q) 6 0.82 2.04 4.07 8.11 0.82 2.04 4.08 8.13 
8 0.75 1.87 3.73 7.43 0.75 1.87 3.73 7.44 
Table 1: Limiting standard deviations of capital growth 9 (percent) 
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the criticality ¢ = 1, which corresponds to our power law in (22) for ¢ = 1. -Also, the 
second moment of the cluster is proportional to an inverse cube of the difference to the 
critical probability, just as we have (1- ¢)-3 in the asymptotic variance of the growth 
rate. We can interpret the criticality condition ¢ = 1 as the case of perfect strategic 
complementarity across firms. By perfect complementarity we mean that a propor-
tional increase in capital of all the other firms induces the same proportional increase 
in capital of a firm, if the increment is larger than the lumpiness. A shock smaller than 
the lumpiness, however, does not cause a symmetric movement across firms because of 
the lumpy behavior. The power-law distribution of aggregate growth rates is caused 
by the perfect complementarity in a global range and no complementarity in a local 
range. 
The possibility of a power-law distribution of sectoral propagation was first pointed 
out by Bak et al. along the lines of the literature of self-organized criticality. The point 
of the literature is that the critical phenomena, which are broadly associated with the 
power-law distributions, can occur at the sink of a class of dynamical systems, whereas 
such criticality had been believed to require a fine tuning of parameters. The "self-
organization" mechanism to arrive at a critical point is expressed in our model as a 
convergence of Si to a uniform distribution. The result differs in the exponent of the 
power-law distribution, which is 1/2 in our model and 1/3 in Bak et al. The difference 
arises from the topology of the network. The latter assumes a two-dimensional lattice 
network in which two avalanches started from neighboring sites can overlap. This leads 
to the longer chain of reaction and thus the flatter power-law tail. Our model assumes a 
global interaction which corresponds to an infinite-dimension case of the lattice models. 
This setup enables us to treat the two neighboring avalanches as mutually independent 
and to utilize the recursive structure of the branching process. 
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3.2 Dynamics 
So far , we have focused on the case in which the firms' positions relative to the thresh-
old follows a uniform distribution. Aggregate investment is shown to be sensitive to 
the configuration of the positions. Aggregate investment will exhibit fluctuations along 
with the evolution of the configuration which is driven by the depreciation of capital. 
In this section we investigate the dynamic path of the aggregate fluctuations by nu-
merically computing the perfect foresight equilibrium path of the product market with 
the wage and interest fixed at the time-average level. 
Parameters are specified as follows. The returns-to-scale parameter ex + r takes 
various values close to one. The labor 's share of income r / p, is equal to 0.58. The 
mark-up rate p, - 1 is set at 0.2. To determine the time-average levels of the aggregate 
variables, we specify the utility function to be quasi-linear, U( Ct , Ht) = log Ct - Ht. 
The annual discount rate of utility is set at (3 = 0.96. The annual depreciation rate 
of capital 5j is assumed to follow a uniform distribution between 0.01 and 0.2. The 
lumpiness Aj follows a normal distribution with mean 1.5 and standard deviation 0.2. 
The equilibrium is computed sequentially for 200 quarters, and the first 100 quarters 
are discarded in order to focus on the stationary fluctuations. Figure 1 plots a salnple 
path of such an equilibrium for the case N = 500000 and ex + r = 0.999. We observe a 
considerable fluctuation of the investment and output, as well as some persistence in 
the both series. 
We compute the standard deviation and the autocorrelation of y for each path, 
and repeat the procedure for 100 times for each parameter set (except for the case 
N = 500000 in which we repeat for 12 times due to heavy computational load) . Table 
2 reports the mean and standard deviation of the computed standard deviations and 
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Figure 1: A simulated path of output (Y) and investment (1) when N = 500000 and 
ex + I' = 0.999 
are reported in parentheses. 
Table 2 confirms that the magnitude of the fluctuation is increasing as the returns to 
scale approach to one. The magnitude decreases as the number of firms increases, but 
even for the case of 500, 000 firms the model generates significant fluctuations. Consid-
ering that the number of operating manufacturing plants in the U.S. is about 350,000 
(Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999)) and that over half of the plants experience 
a I-year capital adjustment of at least 37% of the capital in the estimate of Doms and 
Dunne (1998), we find it a quantitative possibility that the aggregate fluctuations with 
magnitude of empirical business cycles endogenously arise from microscopic discrete 
investments. We also observe in Table 2 that the model generates considerable au-
tocorrelation in output. The synchronization of oscillating capital alone can generate 
auto correlations via echo effects , while the significant heterogeneity in lumpiness and 
18 
Standard deviation of Y (%) Autocorrelation of Y (%) 
a+ l' 0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9 0.99 0.999 
500 0.66 4.71 16.87 43.48 65.63 92.79 
(0.06) (0.59) (3.55) (8.23) (5.23) (2.94) 
N 5000 0.20 1.92 9.32 39.71 55.11 81.50 
(0.02) (0.23) (1.47) (8.74) (7.52) ( 4.92) 
50000 0.07 0.66 4.59 40.80 49.48 67.30 
(0.01 ) (0.07) (0.61) (8.01 ) (6.85) (5.53) 
500000 0.02 0.22 1.87 41.53 46.26 59.79 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.23) (5.90) (6.55) (8.34) 
Table 2: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output 
depreciation rates across firn1s prevents the capital from being completely synchronized 
and exhibiting perfect phase-locking. 
3.3 A case of general equilibrium with imperfect information 
This section presents a particular case of general equilibrium in which the approximated 
pricing formulae (15- 16) hold exactly. We consider a model of imperfect information in 
which the households do not observe the distribution of firms ' positions relative to the 
thresholds. We assume that the households expect the future investment demand func-
tion to be the same as its smoothly-adjusting counterpart as a result of the asymmetric 
information. It is also assumed that the depreciation rate of capital is one hundred 
percent. 
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Let us specify the instantaneous utility function as: 
(24) 
Then the household 's optimal choice must satisfy: 
(25) 
The households expect firm j to maximize the discounted value of profits (10) by choos-
ing a stream of capital kt+l without the discreteness constraint (4). By aggregating 
the first order conditions across j, and by applying 6j = 1, we obtain that for any t: 
D - ,,/(l-" )KP-l P OWt t = Tt (26) 
Aggregate demand for labor is obtained by aggregating the first order condition for the 
maximization problem (10) with respect to hj,t as: 
(27) 
Plugging the same first order condition to the production function yields in aggregation: 
(28) 
Along with the definition of the discount rate for the firm 's dynamic optimization, 
Tt = (Ct/ct_1yr //3, the above equations (25, 26, 27, 28) determine the growth rates of 
yt, C t , Ht, Tt, and Wt given that of Kt . By solving for Wt and Tt, we obtain: 
(~) 
(1 -')')( p - 1)+av 
W 1 -,), (29) 
W 
(~) (p-')('-yf,;) av:r T ( l- ')') (1 + v ) (30) -
r 
These recover our approximation (15,16). The sensitivity of the prices to the capital 
growth, (Br, Bw ), is positive when v is large. In a special case of quasi-linear utility 
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function in which v = 0, we obtain a negative sensitivity BT = Bw = (1 - ,)(p - 1) for 
, <1. 
Consider a general case where 6j is not 1 (but still constant across j). Then the 
equation system is reduced to: 






The functional relation is not exactly same as our approximation (15, 16) , yet we can 
calculate the sensitivity parameter BT, Bw in the neighborhood of the time-average level: 
d log 'Wt I 
d log K t r,'liJ,k 
(1 - ,)(p - 1)(1 - (1 - 6)/f) + av 
1 + v - ,(1 - 6)/f 
dlOgTtl -B (1+_v )-~ 
dlog K t r,'liJ,k - w 1 - , 1 - , 
(33) 
(34) 
We can see that , for the quasi-linear case v = 0, Bw = BT < 0 holds for any 6. We obtain 
Bw ~ 0 and BT ~ 0 when p ~ 1. Thus, the prices do not respond to capital when, 
for example, the technology exhibits constant returns to scale and the goods perfectly 
substitute with each other (J..l ~ 1). The prices are also irresponsive when 6 = 0 and 
f3 ~ 1. Namely, the general equilibriun1 effect by the adjustment of wage and interest 
rate is small when the unit time is short so that the rates of capital depreciation and 
utility discounting are small. 
These results crucially depend on the particular assumption on the household 's ex-
pectation. Since the actual investment generally differs from the expected investment , 
the equilibrium is different from the household 's expectation. In particular , the equi-
librium consumption is determined as output less investment , and thus the marginal 
rate of intertemporal substitution Tt differs ex post from the one applied by firms. 
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4 Conclusion 
This paper characterizes the aggregate fluctuations arising from spillover effects of 
discrete investments at the firm level. The theory of one-sided (8,s) economies has 
shown that the distribution of a firm 's position in an inaction band has a robust 
tendency to converge to a uniform distribution. Based on the theory, we evaluate the 
deterministic fluctuation of aggregate investment along the ergodic evolution of the 
configuration as a stochastic fluctuation whose randomness arises from the stochastic 
configuration of the capital. For each configuration, one-period aggregate investment 
is derived by a fictitious best-response dynamics of firms' investment decisions. The 
best response dynamics unconditional to the initial configuration can be embedded in a 
branching process. This enables us to derive the distribution function of the aggregate 
fluctuation in an explicit form. 
In a partial equilibrium of product markets , the aggregate investment follows a 
power-law distribution with an exponential truncation at the tail. The truncation 
speed is determined by 1 - (a + r ) where a + r is the returns to scale of production 
technology. Under the constant returns to scale, the aggregate investment follows a 
power-law distribution, and its variance is shown to be strictly positive even when there 
are an infinite number of firms. 
The equilibrium path of the model is numerically computed. The simulation con-
firms the validity of the analysis above, and also finds that the paths of output and 
investment show persistence and mild periodicity. This expresses the echo effect in 
which a clustering of investments in a period reappears after several periods. The 
frequency of the echo effect is determined by the natural frequency of a firm 's cap-
ital adjustment, which in our case is equal to the lumpiness (log Aj) divided by the 
depreciation rate (Ilog(l - oj) I). 
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Appendix 
A Proof of Proposition 1 
Let us rewrite the best response dynamics in t. We use u to denote the step in the 
dynamics and suppress t. Let KU denote the average capital defined by (11) with a 
profile kj for u 2:: l. Define kjU by the threshold formula (17) with KU for u 2:: l. For 
u = 0, we define KO = Kt and kjO = kj,t. Define sj = (log kj - log kjU)/ log A. Then 
the dynamics of (kj, sj) is written as follows. 
kq 
J kj,t(1 - 5) (35) 
SO 
J Sj ,t + (log kJ,t - log kj,t) / log A (36) 
kUA 
J if sj < 0 
k~+l 




= sj + (log kj+l -log kj - ¢(log K u+1 - log K U))/ log A (38) J 
We consider the case m 2:: O. Then sj > 1 never happens in the best response 
dynamics for u 2:: 1. The case m < 0 is proved symmetrically by changing the sign 
of adjustments in logarithm. Define Hu for u 2:: 1 as the set of j such that log kj -
log kj-l = log A. Then log kj = log kj-l for u tf. Hu. Define mu as the size of Hu' 
First we examine m = N(log Kl - log Kt)/ log A. We break m into two terms as 
m = N(log Kl -lOg(2:f=l (kJ)P)l/P)/ log A + N (log (2:f=1 (kJ)P)l/P -log Kt)/ log A. The 
second term represents the depreciation and is equal to N log (1 - 5) / log A = - N / q. The 
first term represents the first-step adjustments induced directly by the depreciation. 
By the assumption that Sj ,t follows a uniform distribution, we obtain Pr( sJ < 0) = 1/ q. 
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Then m1 follows a binomial distribution Bin(N, l/q). Thus: 
( 
N ) l/p 
log K1 - log ;; (kJ)P = (1/ p) (lOg (),.P L (kJ)P + L (kJ)P) - log t (kJ)P) 
. H N ·dH N ·1 N JE I J'F I J= 
(1/ p) log (p,.p - 1) (I: (1)P) / (t (1)P) + 1) 
JEHI J=l 
( ( 
)..sap) (N )..sap) ) (l/p)log ()..P-l) .L ; / ~; +1 (39) 
JEHI J=1 
The last line utilized that k; is constant across j when )..j and 6j are constant. Since sJ 
is distributed uniformly, the strong law of large numbers implies that, with probability 
one, 
N \ sJp 1 \ P 1 
lim L _A - = r )..sJPdsq = _A_-_ (40) 
N-+oo j=l N Jo J P log).. 
Also, j E HI is equivalent to 0 :::; sJ < 1/ q. Thus, by the central limit theorem, 
VN("'£jEHI )..sJp /N - J~/q )..sJPdsJ) = VN("'£jEHI )..sJp /N - ()..p/q -1)/(plog )..)) converges 
in distribution as N ---7 00 to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance: 
)..2sj Pdsq _ = _ 10
1/q a ()..P/q - 1)2 )..2p/q - 1 ()..P/q - 1)2 
o J plog).. 2plog).. plog).. ( 41) 
By regarding (39) as a nonlinear function F(x) of x = "'£jEHI )..sJp /VN, we can use the 
delta method to obtain the asymptotic distribution of VN F(x) as a normal distribution 
with mean F(xo) and variance F'(xo? Avar(x) where Xo is the asymptotic mean of x. 
The mean F(xo) is calculated as: 
(
()..P -1)()..p/q -1)/(plog)..) ) _ log).. 
(l/p) log ()"P-l)/(plog)..) +1 - q ( 42) 
and the variance is: 
(43) 
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By collecting the results , it is shown that m/ ffi asymptotically follows a normal 
distribution with mean zero and the variance (43) divided by (log A)2. 
Next we derive a limit for N(log Ku+l - log KU) for u 2:: 1. The Taylor series 
expansion yields: 
N(log K u+1 -log K U) 
(44) 
The residual term in the first equation is of order 1/ N , because it consists of the terms 
involving 8Ku /8kj which is of order l/N , and because the number of terms (the size 
of H u+1 ) is finite with probability one as is shown later. The second equation holds 
since kjU is constant across j. For the same reason the third equation obtains , since 
KU = k*U (Lf=1 AS'j P /N)I /P holds. The average Lf=1 AS'jP /N converges to E[As'jP] as 
N -t 00 almost surely. The expectation is equal to fol AS'jPdsj = (AP - l)/(plogA) , 
because the following three facts hold as N -t 00 as we see later, namely, sj for j E HI 
is uniformly distributed in [l-l/q , l), sj for j tf: U~=IHv is uniformly distributed in 
[0 , 1 - l/q) , and U~=1 Hv is finite with probability one. Also, LjEH
u
+1 AS'jP converges 
to m u+l in distribution. This is because sj < ¢ (log KU -log K u-l) / log A for j E Hu+l 
and the right hand side is of order 1/ N as (44) shows. Thus the summation becomes to 
follow a binomial distribution. Hence, we obtain for u 2:: 1 a convergence in distribution: 
(45) 
Next we examine m u conditional to mu-l for u 2:: 2. We have Pr(j E Hulj tf: 
Uv=I,2, ... ,u-lHv) = (¢ (log K U -log Ku-l)/ log A)/((N - L~:t m v)/ N). Thus mu follows 
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Bin(N - I:~':i mv, (¢(log KU - log K U-I) I log A) I ((N - I:~,:i mv) IN)). This defines 
the stochastic process mu completely. As we let N ------t 00, the limit (45) holds and the 
binomial distribution of 'mu converges to a Poisson distribution with mean ¢mu-I for 
u ~ 3. For u = 2, m2 converges in distribution to a Poisson with mean ¢m where the 
distribution of m is defined conditionally on mI. 
Since a Poisson distribution is infinitely divisible , the Poisson variable with mean 
¢mu-I is equivalent to a mu-rtimes convolution of a Poisson variable with mean ¢. 
Thus the process mu for u ~ 2 conditional to m is a branching process with a step 
random variable being a Poisson with mean ¢ for u ~ 3 and m2 following a Poisson 
with mean ¢m. Since ¢ :::; 1, the process mu reaches 0 by a finite stopping time 
wi th pro babili ty one (see Feller (1957)). Thus the best response dynamics is a valid 
algorithm of equilibrium selection. Let T denote the stopping time. Using the previous 
asymptotic results, we have W ------t I:~=2 mu in distribution. By using the property 
of the Poisson branching process (Kingman (1993)), we obtain an infinitely divisible 
distribution called Borel-Tanner distribution for the accumulated sum W conditional 
to 'm2 as: 
(46) 
for w = m2, 'm2 + 1, .... Using that m2 follows the Poisson distribution with mean ¢m, 
we obtain (21) in the Proposition as follows: 
w 
Pr(W = w I m) = L ((m2Iw)e- ¢W (¢w)W-m2 /(w - 'm2)!)e-mmm2 1m2! 
W 
(me-¢W-mlw) L (¢w)W-m2mm2- 1/((w - m2)!(m2 - I)!) 
(me-¢w-m Iw)(¢w + m)W-I/(w - I)! 
(47) 
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Approximation (22) is obtained by applying the Stirling's formula w! rv V2'ire-www+O.5: 
me-<Pw-m(¢w + m)w-l/w! 
me-<Pw-m(¢w + m)w-l /( V2'ire- www+O.5) 
me(l-<p)w-m((¢w + m)/(¢w))W((¢w + m)/(¢w))-1¢w-1w-1.5 /.;2; 
(me(1/<p-l)m /(¢.;2;)) (e<P- 1 /¢)-wW-1.5 
This completes the proof. 
B Proof of Proposition 2 
(48) 
We focus on (m + W)/ N, provided with the relation (log K t+1 -log K t )/ log A rv (m + 
W) / N shown in the previous proof. The unconditional variance is decomposed as 
follows: 
E(Var(~ Im))+Var(~+E(~ 1m)) 
E [E (var (~ 1m, m2) 1m) + Var (E (~ 1m, m2) 1m) 1 
+ Var G + E ( E (~ I m, m2) 1m)) . (49) 
W asymptotically follows a branching process when N --+ 00 , and by the nature of the 
branching process , IWI conditional to Im21 is equivalent to the 1m2 I-times convolution 
of W conditional to m2 = l. Using these facts, we obtain that: 
Var(W/N I m,m2) 
E(E(W/N I m,m2) 1m) 
Im2IVar(W/N I m2 = 1) 
E(m2 I m)E(W/N I m2 = 1) 




Also, Im21 conditional to m asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with mean Iml 
and the unconditional distribution of m2 is symmetric. Since m/ VFi asymptotically 
follows N(O, O"~) by Proposition 1, we can use the formula E(lml/VFi) -----? O"mJ2/rr. 
Applying these, we obtain: 
Var (m; W) 
E [E (1 m2 I 1m) Var (~ I m2 = 1) + Var( m2 1m) ( E (~ I m2 = 1) ) 2] 
+Var(~+E(~ Im2=1)E(m2I m)) 
(CImV2/7r)E (:'25 1m2 = 1) + CI~ (Jv + E (~ 1m2 = 1) r (52) 
Next we calculate limN-+oo E(w/VFi I m2 = 1) , provided that the best response 
dynamics reaches an equilibrium before all the N firms adjust . Namely, we take the 
expectation conditional to W ~ N for a fixed N by using the asymptotic probability 
function taken from (46) : 
Pr(W = w I m2 = 1, W ~ N) Pr(W ~ N) = e- www- 1 /w!. (53) 
Proof of Proposition 1 shows that the probability of the event W ~ N converges to 
one as N -----? 00. By using the inequality (see Feller (1957)): 
(54) 
we can compute the upper and lower bounds of the probability of W for a fixed N as 
follows. 
N 
E(w/ VFi I 'm2 = 1 vV ~ N) Pr(W ~ N) = L e- www/(w!VFi) 
w=l 
N 




< !oN w-05dw/V27rN 
~N~oo J2/7r (55) 
The second to last line holds because e-1/(12w+l) is bounded by one. Similarly, the 
lower bound turns out to converge to the same value. Let us note that the function 
e- 1/(12w)w - O.5 is decreasing for w > 1/6. Then we obtain: 
N N L e-www/(w!VN) > L e-www/(vf2;ww+O.5e-W+l/(12w)VN) 
w=l w=l 
w=l 
rN +1 > Jl e- 1/(12w)w - O.5dw/V27rN 
(e-1/(12(N+1))VN + 1 - e-1/ 12 + i N+1 w- L5e-1/ (12w) /12dw ) /(O.5V27rN) 
~ N~oo J2/7r (56) 
Hence, E(w/VN I m2 = 1, W ~ N) ~ J2/7r. Similarly, E(W2/N1.5 I m2 = 1) is 
calculated as follows. 
N 
E(W2/N1.5 1m2 = 1, W ~ N) = L e- www+1/(w!N1.5) 
w=l 
w=l 
N L e-1/( 12w)../W/(vf2;N1.5) 
w=l 
> (iN e- 1/(12W)JWdW ) /(vf2;NL5 ) 
(( e-1/(12N) N L5 _ e- 1/ 12 ) /l.5 + iN (WL5 /l.5)e- 1/(12w) (1/ (12w2) )dw ) / (vf2; N L5 ) 
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(e-' /( 12N) _ e-'/12/N'S)/(1.5..;2n-) + ],N w-OSe-1/( 12W) dw/(l8..;2n-NLS) 
~ 1/(1.5..;2n-) (57) 
where the inequality in the fourth line holds since the function e-1/(12w) Vw is increasing 
in w. Similarly, the upper bound is obtained as follows. 
N N L e-www+1/(w!N1.5) < L e- WwW+l/(..;2n-wW+O.5e - W+l/(12w+l)N1.5) 
w=l w=l 
w=l 
rN +1 < Jl e-1/(12W+l)y'Wdw/(..;2n-N1.5) 
(e- 1/(12N+13)(N + 1)"S _ e-1/13 + ],N+1 w-OSe-
'
/(12w+1)(12/(12 + I/W)2)dW) /(l.5..;2n-NLS) 
~ 1/(1.5..;2n-) (58) I 
Hence, we obtain that E(W2/N1.5 1m2 = 1) ~ 1/(1.5v'21f). Collecting the results , we 
obtain that: 
Var (m; W) 
(fm J 2/ 7r E (:'2S I m2 = 1) + Var ( fit ) (f?n ( ~ + E (~ I m2 = 1 ) ) 2 
~N-'>(X) (2/7f)((Jm + 1/3)(Jm (59) 
Hence, the capital growth rate asymptotically has variance (59) times (log ,\)2. 
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Abstract 
This paper proposes a method to analyze endogenous fluctuations of aggre-
gate investment when firm-level investment follows an (S,s) policy and has a 
spillover effect on other firms ' investments. First , we derive the distribution 
function of aggregate fluctuations in a partial equilibrium of differentiated prod-
uct markets, under the assumption that a firm's position in its (S,s) band follows 
a uniform distribution. Second, the variance of the growth rate of average capital 
is shown to converge to a non-zero value when the number of firms tends to in-
finity, if the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Third, we numerically 
compute the equilibrium paths in which the firms' positions evolve determin-
istically. The simulations uphold our analytical results as well as exhibit echo 
effects in the output series. Finally, a case of general equilibrium with imperfect 
information is presented in which the analytical results continue to hold. 
Keyword: Lumpy investment , (S,s) economy, self-organized criticality, contagion 
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1 
1 Introduction 
This paper analyzes a model of endogenous fluctuations of aggregate investment which 
arise from the lumpy behavior of investments at the firm level. It demonstrates that 
aggregate fluctuations occur in a partial equilibrium of product markets even in a 
deterministic environment with infinitely many agents when discrete investments at 
the micro level have spillover effects. 
The recent development of empirical studies on firm-level investments motivates 
this paper. Researchers have shown the importance of discrete choice over the course 
of a firm 's capital adjustment and a great deal of heterogeneity across firms by using 
the longitudinal data. For example, Doms and Dunne (1998) found that establishment 
level capital is adjusted only occasionally but by a jump. Based on the similar em-
pirical findings , Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999) stressed the role that lumpy 
investn1ents played in aggregate fluctuations . Ericson and Pakes (1995) pointed out the 
important effects of exit and entry behavior of firms on collective industrial dynamics, 
presenting a framework for empirical research of firm dynamics. 
These findings call for an analytical method for a dynamical system in which the 
discrete behavior of many heterogeneous agents are coupled with each other. We con-
sider a specific situation in which firms ' lumpy investments have spillover effects . Due 
to the discreteness of the investment, a firm 's capital exhibits non-harmonic oscillation 
if the capital is depreciated physically. With the spillover effect, the dynamics of the 
system is then represented by a collection of coupled oscillators. This paper proposes 
a method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations in this system. 
The literature on (8,s) economies and on non-linear dynamics has tackled the ques-
tion as to how to analyze the aggregate fluctuations that arise from micro-level dis-
creteness, or more generally, micro-level non-linearity. The theory of (8,s) economies 
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